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Enriching trial justice for crime victims in common law systems: 
lessons from transitional environments 
Jonathan Doak 
Durham University 
ABSTRACT 
 
The role of victims in the criminal trial has been subject to considerable critique in recent 
years. This article argues that scholarship and policy governing the treatment of victims and 
witnesses in ‘ordinary’ criminal trials within ‘settled’ societies may be substantially enriched 
by drawing lessons from the roles of, and practices affecting, victims within post-conflict 
societies. There is a clear need for policymakers and law reformers to look beyond the 
familiar spheres of the domestic criminal process if the justice system is to become more 
effective, just and legitimate in the eyes of both victims and the wider public. This article 
draws on both theory and praxis on the role of victims within transitional justice, and 
contends that trial justice in common law systems may be enriched through centring 
processes on three key themes which are commonly emphasised in transitional justice 
frameworks, these being (1) truth recovery; (2) victim participation and (3) reparation.  
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Introduction 
 
In contrast to continental Europe, most Anglo-American criminal trial systems are adversarial 
in nature and have been succinctly characterised as a ‘sharp clash of proofs presented by 
litigants in a highly structured forensic setting’ (Landsman, 1984: 2).  There is no shortage of 
literature documenting the plight of victims in their capacities as witnesses (Bala et al, 2010; 
Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses in England and Wales, 2011; Ellison 2001; 
Spencer and Lamb, 2012; Tinsley and McDonald, 2011); their exclusion from proceedings 
(Fielding, 2006; Rock, 1993; Shapland et al, 1985); their inability to participate in any 
meaningful way (Roberts and Erez, 2010; Shapland and Hall, 2010; Wemmers, 2009) and 
the lack of opportunity to seek either symbolic or material redress (Davis, 1992; Doak, 2008; 
Williams, 2005). Despite the expansion of protective measures for vulnerable witnesses and 
various schemes enabling victims to exercise a voice in criminal sentencing, adversarialism 
and bipartisanship remain firmly ingrained in the mechanics of the common law criminal trial.  
 
In a seminal article published just over three decades ago, Doreen McBarnet was critical of 
efforts to ease the plight of the victim in adversarial courtrooms. All too often, she argued, 
analysis of the problems facing victims focused on visible issues, as opposed to questioning 
‘the deeper structures that help create them’ (McBarnet, 1983: 303). Her observation proved 
apposite; whilst many policy and law reforms have since been promoted in the name of 
victims, their underlying rationale is often attributed to the lucrative political appeal of the 
crime victim (Geis, 1990; Garland, 2001), rather than any desire to grapple with such 
problems in a principled and systemic manner.  
 
Yet the prospects of more the far-reaching, structural reforms that McBarnet envisaged have 
seemingly been boosted in recent years, as policymakers, victim groups, and academic 
criminologists have illustrated an increasing readiness to look beyond the familiar to 
practices that appear to be working well in other jurisdictions. There can be little doubt, that if 
engineered carefully, comparative criminal justice can reap benefits in the form of fresh 
insights and novel solutions for areas of both theory and practice that has become parched 
and stagnant over time (Brants, 2011). While we have become increasingly adept at drawing 
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lessons from elsewhere, there remains a marked reluctance to look beyond the disciplinary 
parameters of criminal justice and criminology, to explore how other fields of study might 
enrich criminal justice policymaking. Notwithstanding a recent surge in the criminology of 
state crime (see eg. Cohen, 1995; Green and Ward, 2000), there has been relatively little 
engagement among criminologists with the potential lessons that might be extrapolated for 
‘ordinary’ criminal justice from post-conflict environments. In many (though by no means all) 
such settings, victims have featured prominently in the language of transition; with those 
facilitating such processes being acutely aware of the need to acknowledge and provide 
redress for those who have borne the brunt of suffering in settings which are frequently 
marked by the abuse or absence of the rule of law, human rights and international 
humanitarian law. 
 
This article contends that scholarship and policy governing the treatment of victims and 
witnesses of ‘ordinary’ crime within ‘settled’ societies may be substantially enriched by 
drawing lessons from the roles of, and practices affecting, victims within transitional justice 
processes. It is not claimed that such processes are perfect, or that they offer a particular 
model of practice that might be readily transplanted into domestic systems. However, it is 
suggested that the rise of transitional justice has heralded a creative space for a number of 
diverse and innovative practices – as well as different ways of conceptualising harm and 
victimhood - which might act as a catalyst for challenging entrenched normative conceptions 
of the role of victims, as well as their practical treatment, within common law trial 
frameworks. 
 
The article begins by clarifying a number of key concepts and explores the feasibility of 
drawing lessons from transitional justice frameworks to inform the practices of domestic 
criminal justice. The second part of the article explores how ‘ordinary’ criminal justice might 
be enriched through reconfiguring criminal trials around three key values which are 
commonly emphasised in transitional justice discourse, these being (1) truth recovery; (2) 
victim participation and (3) reparation. Finally, in conclusion, it is argued that the lens of 
criminal justice needs to be recalibrated so that reformers are emboldened to look beyond 
familiar legal spheres for ideas that might make justice more effective, more just and more 
legitimate for both victims and the wider public. 
 
Is cross-fertilisation feasible?   
Before questioning which specific lessons might be drawn from transitional justice for 
application within criminal justice, it may be useful to ponder some of the more subtle – and 
potentially problematic – aspects of this fertilisation. As a starting point, it cannot be denied 
that these two forms of justice are concerned with quite different objectives. While there is a 
reasonably settled consensus that the academic study of criminal justice concerns the 
institutional response of society to criminal behaviour (Roberts, 1998), the boundaries of the 
relatively nascent field of transitional justice are much more uncertain. The United Nations 
defines transitional justice as the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to 
ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation (United Nations Security 
Council, 2004). To this end, transitional justice adopts a broad range of tools, including the 
use of international courts and tribunals, hybrid national-international trials, regional human 
rights courts; as well as domestic devices such as trials, truth commissions, lustrations, 
memorial events, institutional reform and other mechanisms designed to deal with the past 
and build peace for the future.1  
While criminal justice may therefore constitute a tool from which transitional justice 
responses may draw, the prosecution of ex-combatants is often intentionally partial in post-
conflict settings because it best serves the interests of transition (Bell, 2009). Other goals, 
such as the pursuit of truth, the entrenchment of human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law, the need for social and economic investment and the construction of infrastructure may 
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be deemed to be of equal or greater importance. Even where prosecutions do form part of 
the transitional package, the concepts of blame and responsibility are often different since 
radical evil involves horrific acts that even ordinary criminals may find appalling (Aukerman, 
2002). In short, the need for transitional justice tends to arise in highly difficult and complex 
settings. While these may differ substantially from each other, the majority are fundamentally 
different from settled societies in that they lack the institutional resources and infrastructure 
to mete out justice in the usual way. This raises the question as to whether the importation of 
aspects of theory or praxis is desirable, or even feasible at all, with certain commentators 
advancing the view that it operates in such unusual circumstances it essentially constitutes a 
form of ‘extraordinary’ justice, which is theoretically and practically distinct from ‘ordinary’ 
forms of justice (Gray, 2005). A more persuasive view places transitional justice at the 
extreme end of a legal and political continuum (Posner and Vermuele, 2004); indeed, there 
are a number of conceptual overlaps which suggest that these spheres do not stand in 
absolute isolation from one another.  
 
First, both sub-disciplines share certain common rationales and objectives, insofar as 
criminal justice and transitional justice are both societal responses to human conflict caused 
by a breakdown in social control. While themes such as conflict resolution and peace-
making tend to be associated much more with transitional justice discourse rather than 
criminal justice, the historical rationale for the establishment of the criminal justice systems 
was the exertion of social control to safeguard the interests of the monarch. Although in 
more recent times the criminal law has still been used to protect the interests of elites, it has 
also been used as a tool of social reform, and has played some role in shifting the traditional 
balances of power and offering protection to the socially weak (Sorochinsky, 2009). In a 
similar vein, transitional justice holds a transformative potential: by providing a legal 
framework under which perpetrators can be held to account; the entrenchment of human 
rights and the rule of law; and through facilitating the empowerment of groups that have 
been historically excluded or disadvantaged under previous regimes. 
 
Secondly, on a related note, the key stakeholders – perpetrators, victims and communities – 
are essentially the same. While transitional justice is perhaps more concerned with 
addressing macro-level, inter-communal conflicts, the individual conflicts that regulated the 
criminal law also entail wider ramifications insofar as crime is not solely harmful to individual 
victims, but is also injurious to local communities as well as the public at large. While the two 
forms of justice often place different degrees of emphasis on the intended outcomes, the 
primary actors affected are the same, and similar conundrums apply, such as the potential 
overlap between victims and offenders, as well as notions of hierarchy and blame-
worthiness (McEvoy and MacConnachie, 2013). In essence, both transitional justice and 
criminal justice seek to provide normative frameworks for accountability for individual 
conflicts. From a victim’s perspective in particular, it has been noted that victims of non-state 
actors in ‘ordinary’ criminal justice, and victims of international crimes or human rights 
abuses in transitional justice, have much in common; both groups suffer similar emotional 
plights and psychological responses, such as self-blame and outrage; the impact of the 
offence on their lives may be similar, and both feel the need for some form of redress from 
the offender (Elias, 1986; Doak, 2008). Despite the latter group of victims often suffering 
more in both the extent and severity of victimisation, their unmet needs and the responses 
they seek are often similar within the criminal and transitional spheres.  
 
Thirdly, cross-fertilisation between criminal justice and transitional justice is already de facto 
reality, in that criminal processes are frequently adopted as tools of transitional justice: the 
considerable range of international and hybridised courts and tribunals that have evolved in 
recent decades bear testament to this.2 Despite dealing with crimes which have been 
committed in a different social context and which may be of a different magnitude from those 
typically encountered in domestic settings, we should not discount the potential lessons that 
international criminal justice might hold. Unlike regional permanent human rights institutions 
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such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, these criminal tribunals are directly concerned with the individual perpetrators of 
crimes, rather than the broader issue of the failure of states to abide by human rights norms. 
Rather than looking downwards (towards states) and backwards (towards evaluating 
whether their processes are human rights-compliant), we might instead look upwards 
(towards supra-national fora) and forwards (towards the emerging systems, processes and 
jurisprudence of these new institutions). Moreover, and in part due to the post-conflict 
environments from which they have tended to emerge, international criminal justice 
policymakers are becoming more keenly aware of the need to ensure that their future 
success is ultimately dependent on their perceived legitimacy in the eyes of individual 
victims and the wider victim communities (Henham, 2011).   
 
It can therefore be argued that there are essentially sound grounds for criminal justice 
policymakers and academics alike to draw on carefully selected aspects of theory, policy 
and practice of transitional justice that appear to work most effectively as far as victims are 
concerned.  Its potential to enrich justice for victims stems primarily from the fact that the 
need for innovation and individually tailored responses is a sine qua non of the transitional 
paradigm. While the rationales, objectives and processes of adversarial criminal justice have 
evolved over many centuries, there is something of an innovative urgency among transitional 
justice solutions; they are borne out of a pressing need to make political peace between 
communities, rather than creating a social peace between individuals who are in the midst of 
ongoing conflicts with each other. In recognising the need that they are perceived as 
legitimate, they have had to confront head-on certain problematic issues which are all too 
often fudged within conventional criminal justice theory and practice, such as victimisation of 
indigenous communities; the prevalence of victim/offender overlap and the collective nature 
of offending and victimisation. In turn, this means that transitional processes – whilst 
imperfect – are often better attuned to the needs of victims. As such, the best transitional 
justice arrangements do not rest on linear assumptions on how best to deal with conflict and 
tend not to be overly-institutionalised, but are instead multi-faceted, often cutting across the 
formal and informal; the top-down and the bottom-up; and making the most effective use of 
social capital and civil society (Woolford and Ratner, 2008).   
 
Part III: Areas for Enrichment 
It is argued that there are three key prevalent values within transitional justice discourse 
which may provide a normative basis around which reform of conventional criminal justice 
may gravitate. These values, which are somewhat interlinked, are (1) Truth recovery, (2) 
Victim Participation and (3) Reparation. This section discusses each of these themes in turn 
and provides an overview of, firstly, why a particular value matters, both from the victim’s 
perspective and as far as the broader objectives of criminal justice are concerned. Secondly, 
the discussion outlines how each theme has emerged as a focal point in transitional justice 
discourse, before proffering some suggestions as to how established adversarial models of 
justice might be adapted to enhance the ways in which these values might be protected and 
promoted. 
 
(1) Truth recovery 
The truth about what happened – and why – is often cited as a priority for both victims of 
state and non-state actors alike (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
2009). Truth recovery in transitional justice frameworks often goes beyond the idea of a 
factual’ or ‘forensic’ truth, and emphasises the need to explore a broader form of truth which 
is capable of giving insights into the political, social, and ideological context by which their 
actions are understood (McEvoy, 2006) .Whilst uncovering the truth cannot resurrect the 
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dead or heal physical or psychological scars, it may help victims come to terms with past 
events by helping them to re-organise their thoughts into a coherent narrative that allows 
them to better understand past events and experience a sense of closure (Smyth and 
Pennebaker, 1999). A further potential benefit lies in the fact that the public revelation of 
hitherto concealed facts may for the public record of events, thereby acknowledging the 
suffering of victims and vindicating their status (Cohen, 1995).  
 
The concept of a ‘right to truth’ for victims of gross human rights violations is increasingly 
regarded as either a rule of customary international law or a widely accepted general 
principle (Naqvi, 2006). In the seminal case of Ellacuria3 before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, it was held that such a right comprises two constituent elements: a collective 
right ‘that ensures society access to information that is essential for the workings of 
democratic systems’ and a private right for victims and their families, which ‘affords a form of 
compensation’ (at para 224). Similar precepts are to be found in the United Nations Set of 
Principles to Combat Impunity, which were recently updated to recognise the right to victim’s 
‘inalienable’ right to truth (Principle 2), including the rights of victims’ families to know the 
truth about the circumstances in which violations took place and, in the event of death or 
disappearance, the victims’ fates (Principle 4).  
 
Irrespective of its legal status, the notion of a right to truth has underpinned many post-
conflict transitions over the past two decades under the auspices of the archetypal truth 
commission, a body set up to inquire and report into past wrongdoing. Whilst the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has undoubtedly received the most attention, 
similar commissions have been widely adopted in Latin America, Asia and other parts of 
Africa (see generally Hayner, 2011).4 Truth commissions have been subject to a range of 
both principled and pragmatic objections, not least because they are often used as an 
alternative to criminal prosecution. Moreover, empirical studies suggest that victims’ 
experiences with such institutions are far from perfect. In the case of South Africa, for 
example, many victims reported that their expectations had not been met and only few 
victims felt that they had received the ‘truth’ that had been promised to them (see eg Byrne, 
2004; Hamber et al, 2000; Kaminer et al, 2001). Nevertheless, truth recovery is rightly 
recognised as an essential element in conflict resolution, and is clearly highly valued by 
victims. 
 
While truth recovery features prominently in transitional contexts, its potential in relation to 
healing micro-level conflicts between individuals in settled societies has not received such 
widespread attention. However, we do know from existing studies of crime victims that one 
of their main concerns revolves around the need to have questions answered; the ‘why me?’ 
question, in particular, is one which holds particular importance for many victims of serious 
crime (Sherman and Strang, 2003). Likewise, studies into the mental health of crime victims 
reveal that post-traumatic stress disorder and depression are more prevalent than may 
previously have been thought (Herman, 2003; Kilpatrick and Acierno, 2003). It follows that 
the provision of information concerning, for example, why an offender acted in a particular 
way, or why a specific person was targeted, may help victims to better understand what 
happened and thereby aid the healing process (Miller, 2008). 
  
Regrettably, the notion of a right to truth within the ‘ordinary’ criminal justice process has not 
been widely discussed, and does not appear to feature within the policy agenda on either 
the national or international platforms. Indeed, the adversarial criminal process is remarkably 
inept at eliciting the truth of past events and offers, at best, only a partial insight into past 
events. From the moment an offence in reported, the criminal process readily compromises 
the search for truth. Recollections of past events, along with associated evidence, are 
routinely manipulated, decontextualised and recategorised, before an attempt is made to re-
organise them so that they correspond with abstract legal principles (Cole, 2001). Ericson 
(1981: 9) famously noted how the evidence-gathering process is a form of ‘information 
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control’ by the police, dependent upon ‘the investigation they do or do not undertake; the 
questions they do and do not ask; the interpretations they do and do not give to the answers; 
the written accounts they give and what they leave out’. Plea negotiation and the acceptance 
of guilty pleas generally bring to a close any inquiry into the nature of past events, which can 
then leave victims feeling further marginalised and irrelevant (Doak, 2008).  
 
Such ‘information control’ remains in place in the trial arena. Here, the prosecution and 
defence counsel hold a near-complete autonomy to select which evidence (and which 
witnesses) are brought before the trier of fact, and will generally seek to elicit only those 
facts which the advocate feels will support their version of events. It has been well 
documented how advocates use stories to relate to juries, and encourage them to make 
experiential connections with a particular story frame that is presented to them (Bennett and 
Feldman, 1981; Hall, 2009). Evidence is carefully selected, omitted, and reframed in a way 
that supports this constructed narrative, and is presented to the court through carefully 
crafted questions and answers (Doak, 2008).  For their part, victims have no right to offer 
their own narrative to the court, and, where they are called as witnesses, their narratives 
accounts are often stifled by both the adversarial environment and over-zealous advocates 
(Ellison, 2001; Fielding, 2006; Hall, 2009). There is something of an irony in the fact that the 
adversarial system demands that victims and offenders testify in open court, swearing an 
oath ‘to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,’ when, in fact the nature of 
advocacy establishes parameters within which all witnesses are expected to confine their 
answers. In short, the adversarial model of proof serves to thwart a robust and rigorous 
assessment of past events in favour of constructing dominant and linear narrative that 
favours either the prosecution or defence.  
The trial process culminates in the declaration of the verdict, with the fact-finder determining 
the outcome of the trial by declaring a ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ verdict in respect of each 
individual charge.5 While the verdict may be said to constitute a form of ‘official’ truth, such a 
‘truth’ is ultimately based on a process which places a relatively low value on truth recovery. 
No narrative is offered concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ evidence, or 
which particular parts of it the trier of fact elected to accept. At the end of the day, victims 
(and indeed defendants) are offered a narrow and vastly simplified version of the truth in the 
form of a one (or two) word verdict, with no requirement for the fact-finder to explain its 
reasoning. It is not suggested here that the pursuit of truth ought to be the sole objective of 
the criminal trial; other important goals include the need to account for due process and fair 
trial rights, upholding matters of public policy and imposing practical time restraints. 
However, it is suggested that truth recovery ought to at least carry a higher priority and it 
may - failing an unlikely overnight move to an inquisitorial model of proof -  be possible to 
reconfigure certain aspects of the adversarial tradition to strengthen its truth recovery 
potential without compromising on such goals.  
First, defendants should be incentivised to disclose full information about the offence at an 
early point in the criminal process. It is unfortunate that many defendants tend to admit 
factual guilt to police before deciding – on the basis of legal advice – to contest legal guilt, 
thereby triggering a full trial or, more likely, prompting the prosecution to propose a plea 
bargain (Daly, 2008). As noted above, this can leave victims feeling as though they have 
been denied justice. Writing in the context of international criminal justice, Nancy Armory 
Combs (2007, cited by Daly, 2008) proposes a mechanism that may be able to counteract 
this tendency. She proposes a ‘restorative justice guilty plea’, whereby defendants would 
proffer a full and complete account of their activities to the victim in exchange for the 
prosecution agreeing not to charge certain crimes or to dismiss charges already brought. 
Combs does not give full details on the precise logistics of the victim / offender interaction 
that might to occur, but it is clear that some form of direct restorative encounter is envisaged, 
citing the South African TRC as ‘a useful model’ (Combs, 2007: 143). In addition, defendants 
would be encouraged to offer apologies and other forms of reparation including, for example, 
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the location of a body or cause of death as part of their plea. This information would then be 
taken into account by the court in determining the sentence. While Combs’ research was 
carried out in the specific context of international criminal tribunals, there is no compelling 
reason why a similar approach could not be adopted within domestic criminal processes. 
Secondly, in relation to the trial itself, there is a need for greater judicial muscularity in 
controlling the excesses of the adversary system. While judges are under a notional 
obligation to protect victims from aggressive or irrelevant questioning by counsel, the 
dichotomous nature of the adversarial trial means that excessive intervention may be 
perceived as partisanship on the part of the trial judge and possible grounds for an appeal 
(Doak, 2008). For that reason, judges have been reluctant to interrupt and rebuke counsel 
where the testimony of witnesses is being tightly contained by rigorous question-and-
answer, without any opportunity for witnesses to relate their experiences to the court using 
their own words (Ellison, 2001). To this end, stronger judicial guidance and training is 
needed to encourage judges to allow witnesses greater freedom to answer questions in a 
full and comprehensive manner. Indeed, Hall (2009) proposes that victims - and indeed all 
witnesses - could begin their testimony with a ‘free narrative’ phase. Counsel would then be 
free to clarify or challenge any issues raised through questioning. This should, in theory at 
least, increase the flow of information to the trier of fact. 
Thirdly, we ought to reconsider the nature of verdicts themselves. In any criminal justice 
system which purports to subscribe to international human rights standards, it seems 
intuitively odd that juries are empowered to deprive someone of their liberty without offering 
reasons for their verdict. While this prima facie stands as an affront to principles of both 
natural justice and the most basic element of a right to a fair hearing, international human 
rights fora have tended to steer a wide berth around the issue given the centrality of the jury 
system to common law criminal trials. This is not a question that has been probed in any 
detail either on the policy or academic fronts, but a recent case from the European Court of 
Human Rights has begun to ignite debate on the issue (see eg Coen, 2014; Roberts, 2011).6 
The future prospect of requiring criminal courts to offer some sort of explanation for their 
verdicts may not be so far off on the horizon as had once been assumed.  
 
Participation  
A second key value is the notion of participation. Until recently, victims were largely excluded 
from transitional justice mechanisms (Karstedt, 2010), and their treatment – particularly 
before international courts and tribunals – was widely criticised (Dembour and Haslam, 
2004; Kelsall and Stepakoff, 2007; Zacklin, 2004). Institutions and top-down processes have 
tended to regard victims’ voices as irrelevant – if not hindrances – to the more pressing 
social and political objectives of ending conflict and building peace. Victims may be 
something of an awkward adjunct, with divergent yet pressing needs that impoverished, war-
torn societies are unable to meet. Their accounts are unpredictable, and may sit uneasily 
alongside official or reconciliatory narratives of the conflict peace (McEvoy and 
MacConnachie, 2013).  
Nevertheless, the potential benefits of victim participation now feature prominently in 
transitional justice discourse (Bonacker et al, 2011; Kelsall and Stepakoff 2007; McEvoy and 
MacConnachie, 2013.; McGonigle-Leyh, 2011). It is now broadly accepted that transitions 
are unlikely to be successful without the support of victims and their communities. There is 
also some evidence to suggest that (as with ‘ordinary’ criminal justice) victim participation 
increases satisfaction with justice processes, and may – under certain conditions - even 
provide potential mental health benefits to crime victims through normalising emotions and 
assuaging feelings of anger, resentment, depression, discouragement, self-hatred and guilt 
(see Doak, 2011).  
 8 
 
Undoubtedly, practice has improved in recent years. Under Article 68(3) of the Rome 
Statute, the International Criminal Court has the discretion to permit the views of victims and 
their concerns to be presented and considered at whatever stages in the proceedings it 
thinks fit, where the personal interests of victims are affected. Victims may choose their own 
legal representatives, who in turn may present their views and make submissions when their 
interests are likely to be affected provided that the leave of the Court is obtained. While such 
mechanisms resonate with the procedures available to victims in many civil law jurisdictions, 
they are highly unusual in common law settings.  Although some concerns have been raised 
as to how effectively these provisions operate in practice (McGonigle-Leyh, 2011; Van den 
Wyngaert, 2012), many of these problems seem to stem from the sheer number of cases 
and the related resourcing issues. The very existence of the provision constitutes a turning 
point for international criminal justice, though it may take some time before it can be said to 
be a wholly positive development for victims. 
Notwithstanding progress at the ICC, it is the truth commission, rather than the court, which 
is frequently lauded as the more ‘victim-friendly’ mechanism of transitional justice. The 
concept of a public forum where victims may recount their stories and hear directly from 
perpetrators (Weitekamp et al, 2006) carries an innate appeal. Victims may, after all, receive 
vital information about the fate of a loved one, hear an acknowledgement of responsibility, or 
even receive some form of apology. However, as noted in the previous section, empirical 
insights into the practical operation of truth commissions all too often reveal that victims are 
left dissatisfied (Byrne, 2004; Hamber et al, 2000; Kaminer et al, 2001). Indeed, 
opportunities for actual interaction between the parties is often limited or non-existent 
(Clamp and Doak, 2012; Doak, 2011). While some of these problems may be attributable to 
matters of praxis, such as weak infrastructure, inadequate planning and insufficient 
resourcing, arguably there is also a normative barrier for victims too, insofar as truth 
commissions are concerned first and foremost with ending conflict and building peace 
(Clamp and Doak, 2012). In most truth commissions therefore, the role of victims tends to be 
purely instrumental. This role is similar to that exercised to the one which they exercise in 
the criminal court (ie, as a provider of information). Whilst truth commissions may give 
victims greater leeway to tell their own stories in their own words, their own narratives about 
what happened in the past, and indeed with how the perpetrator(s) ought to be dealt with in 
the future are subsumed by the torrent of the grander narrative of the transition. As McEvoy 
and MacConnachie (2013) illustrate, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
frequently ‘eulogised’ reconciliatory or forgiving accounts of victims, while those narratives 
which offered a different ‘truth’ went largely unheard. Such a situation, they argue, was a 
direct result of ‘the elite-driven social and political mood of music in South Africa’ (at p. 8). It 
is perhaps unsurprising then, that truth commissions can often seem tepid and ineffectual to 
victims, and that, on occasions, courts may actually seem to be a better guarantor of their 
rights and interests (Freeman, 2006). 
Despite the predominance of courts and truth commissions, there are other transitional 
justice tools through which victims are able to participate and which arguably offer 
significantly better prospects. Transitional justice need not always come ‘from above’, and it 
is clear that, on occasion, mechanisms which have either emerged from, or are based on, 
new or existing grassroots practices are often deemed to do a better job in engaging victims 
and communities (see generally McEvoy and McGregor, 2008). Illustrations from Northern 
Ireland, in particular, are readily found in the literature, and include the role of the Peace 
People (Byrne, 2001), the Ardoyne Commemoration Project (Lundy and McGovern, 2008), 
and more recently the evolution of community-based restorative justice schemes in 
traditional ‘no-go’ areas for the police during the Troubles (McEvoy and Mika, 2001). 
Examples from elsewhere include the use of Street Committees during the Apartheid era in 
South Africa (Burman and Schärf, 1990), grassroots reconciliation projects in Colombia 
(Diaz, 2008) or the work of the Peace Foundation in Bougainville in the aftermath of the civil 
war (Braithwaite, 2010).  
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On occasions, policymakers will seek to co-opt or modify pre-existing forms of informal and 
community justice in an effort to boost the legitimacy of top-down transitional justice 
arrangements. The most widely cited example is perhaps the revival of the gacaca system in 
Rwanda, although concerns have been expressed about the alleged use of coercion, issues 
of gender equality, and excessively punitive sanctions (Waldorf, 2006). A practice known as 
nahe biti in Timor Leste has arguably done a better (albeit imperfect job) of securing support 
from victims and communities (see Grenfell, 2006; Kingston, 2006). Here the Commission 
for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation permitted perpetrators of “less serious crimes” who 
gave full confessions to avoid prosecution, but they were instead urged to participate in a 
localised ‘Community Reconciliation Process’, which was, broadly speaking, a form of 
mediation based on customary law (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in 
East Timor, 2005).7 
 
While the varied mechanisms of transitional justice differ in the extent to which they offer 
meaningful participation, it is the clear that the value placed on victim participation is 
significant. There is a broad appreciation of the fact that post-conflict justice cannot be 
meted out in an effective or fair manner where victims are essentially precluded from 
exercising a central role.  
 
As far as conventional criminal justice is concerned, there has been no shortage of critique 
levied at it to the effect that the victim is the ‘forgotten man’ of the criminal justice system. 
Christie’s (1977) seminal critique as to how the state came to ‘appropriate’ the criminal 
conflict over the centuries is widely accepted. While recent years have undoubtedly 
witnessed a trend whereby the participatory role of the victim has been significantly 
improved, victims still cannot be considered to be active participants or be able to exercise a 
voice to any meaningful extent. As illustrated above, the adversarial structure of the trial 
dictates that advocates effectively own the trial arena. Victims – and indeed defendants – 
are relegated to the role of ‘evidentiary cannon fodder’ in the form of witnesses for either 
side (Braithwaite, 1992). Once the trial stage has been completed, the victim’s role as a 
witness comes to an end, and he or she effectively becomes a spectator to any sentencing 
proceedings. While defence counsel will often produce a lengthy statement of mitigation, 
traditionally victims have had no standing either to exercise their own voice or to challenge 
mitigation but forward by the defence (Sanders and Jones, 2007). 
 
However, the past two decades have witnessed in change in attitudes towards the victim’s 
role at sentencing. Although victims remain structurally isolated from the adversarial 
paradigm, significant efforts have been made in recent years to confer victims with some 
form of procedural involvement. The most common device for this purpose is the victim 
impact statement, which is now widely used across the common law world. In most 
jurisdictions, the impact statement is primarily to inform the court of the physical, emotional 
or financial harm suffered by the victim as the result of an offence. This information is then 
used by the court to assess the severity of the offence. There is some evidence that victim 
impact statements may give victims a sense of confidence and control, which can also serve 
to reduce feelings of anger and retribution (Karremans and Van Lange, 2005).8 While some 
commentators are sceptical about either the utility or desirability of victim impact evidence 
(see eg Ashworth, 2000; Buruma, 2004), Erez (1999: 550) has stated that “[t]he cumulative 
knowledge acquired from research in various jurisdictions, in countries with different legal 
systems, suggests that victims often benefit from participation and input. With proper 
safeguards, the overall experience of providing input can be positive and empowering.”9 It 
might, however, be added that such therapeutic effects will not be universally experienced 
by all victims; and indeed there is some evidence that while participation may help victims in 
some cases, it may hinder it in others (Hoyle, 2011).  
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A ‘right’ to participate in sentencing is now contained within various constitutional 
instruments of some US states (Gewurz and Mercurio, 2012), but elsewhere many such 
rights are often laid down in national codes of practice and charters. In many cases, these 
tend to be declaratory in nature and are non-binding in the sense that they are not justiciable 
in the courts (Hall, 2010). For example, although the Victims’ Code of Practice in England 
and Wales is enshrined in statute,10 its provisions are not legally binding; victims have no 
means of enforcing rights or entitlements contained therein (Ministry of Justice, 2013). 
Complaints may, of course, be made to service-providers who breach the Code, and a 
Member of Parliament may refer such a matter to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, but the 
fact remains that victims cannot cite the Code as an ipso facto source of law.  
 
Secondly, there is significant confusion in many jurisdictions about the overall purpose of 
victim impact evidence and how, precisely, this is factored into the sentencing process 
alongside other aggravating and mitigating factors. Ambiguous instructions, stating that such 
evidence is to be ‘considered’ or ‘taken into account’ is used in both England /Wales and 
Canada, but there is often little further guidance for courts to consider (Roberts and Manikis, 
2011). In their interviews with judges in Scotland, Chalmers et al (2007) found it difficult to 
isolate the effect of the victim impact statement from the vast array of other factors that were 
built into the sentencing equation, though the researchers do note a number of incidents 
where judges were minded to ‘consider a sentence of a different nature from the one they 
were initially minded to impose’ (at p. 376).  Similar findings were uncovered by Erez and 
Tontodonato (1990) in South Australia. 
 
This leads to a third difficulty, namely that the content of such statements is almost always 
limited in that victims may only comment on the impact of the crime upon them and no 
specific demands may be made as to sentence. The statement is essentially a source of 
information to the sentencer; there is no opportunity to engage in any meaningful sense with 
the offender (for example, by asking questions). If victims feel overly constrained in what 
they can or cannot say, there is a risk that a process that was established with the objective 
of delivering a ‘voice’ for victims may not constitute a true ‘voice’ at all, but rather be 
replaced with a sanitised and innocuous version of events which is less capable of fully 
conveying to the court the full intricacies of the crime’s impact upon the victim (Doak and 
Taylor, 2013). 
  
While the sentencing stage of proceedings is certainly more inclusive than it once was, it 
remains the case that victims remain structurally excluded from adversarial justice in most 
common law systems. However, an international perspective suggests that there is no 
normative reason why victims ought not to be able to exercise participatory rights within an 
adversarial paradigm. Serious consideration ought to be afforded to the question as to 
whether it might be possible to confer victims in domestic courts with rights of participation 
similar to those held by victims at the ICC. Indeed, limited forms of independent legal 
representation have already been introduced in a number of common law jurisdictions. 
Examples include Canada, where complainants in cases of rape and sexual assault are able 
to make submissions to the court on the disclosure of medical records, and the Republic of 
Ireland, where victims have a statutory right to legal representation on questions concerning 
the admissibility of previous sexual history evidence (see generally Raitt, 2010). Nsereko 
(2010) suggests that national jurisdictions could also learn from the emphasis placed on 
‘personal’ harm by the ICC. This emphasis, he believes, could also allow indirect victims to 
participate in cases where their personal interests are at stake (though – as with the ICC - 
the decision as to what constitutes ‘the personal interests of the victims’ is likely to be a 
matter which is left to the Court’s discretion). 
 
It is also possible that victims could play a much more meaningful role at the sentencing 
stage of proceedings than through reading aloud a traditional victim impact statement. Such 
a role could be effected through referral to a restorative justice process (as discussed in the 
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next section), or through conferring victims with a direct right of allocution, whereby they 
would prepare and read their own statements in court. They ought to be conferred with a 
relatively broad remit as to its content, and might also include photographs, drawings or 
poems as is currently permitted in the Australian state of Victoria (Bandes, 1996). 
Importantly, victims could also ask questions directly to the offender. Of course, defence 
counsel should also be offered the opportunity to respond to victims’ statements, and, 
indeed challenge them where appropriate. There are two obvious risks with such a move. 
First, it could be that the victim’s account is rendered more prevalent than the other evidence 
that needs to be factored into account (Bandes, 1996), and thus carry a degree of weight 
that ought not be attached to it. Secondly, there is a risk that proceedings could become 
unwieldy and protracted, which could actually exacerbate the stress that the victim may have 
felt in giving evidence in the first place. Nevertheless, it is suggested with close judicial 
management, proper preparation, and carefully formulated ground rules, both of these risks 
could be substantially offset.  
 
Reparation  
The provision of redress – or reparation – to victims is routinely provided for within many 
transitional societies (de Greiff, 2010; Elster, 2004; Torpey, 2006). Whilst the specific 
modalities of individual reparation programmes vary significantly, the moral justification is 
said to be twofold: first, to validate the status of the victim as a citizen whose rights have 
been violated, and secondly, to contribute towards fostering trust between victim 
communities and State institutions (de Greiff, 2010).  
 
Indeed, recent years have seen the notion of a ‘right’ to reparation being placed on a robust 
legal footing.  The concept has been significantly advanced through recent jurisprudence of 
both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and its European counterpart, and is now 
regarded as a principle of customary international law (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 
2006). Reparation may assume different forms. The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law categorise reparations according to whether they are material 
or symbolic in nature. Examples of the former include proprietary and pecuniary measures, 
most notably restitution of rights and property and compensation for physical and mental 
harm or damage to property, whereas symbolic restitution is potentially much broader, 
including concepts such as rehabilitation’, ‘satisfaction’ (including verification of facts, official 
apologies, judicial sanctions against violations, and acts of commemoration) and ‘guarantees 
of non-repetition’ (which may include entrenching international human rights standards and 
putting in place mechanisms to monitor conflict resolution. Of course, not all reparation 
programmes will be capable of realising all these objectives, but the instrument reflects the 
fact that victims have a complex range of needs which ought to be addressed using a 
diverse range of methods.  
 
While there is a dearth of empirical research documenting the specific needs and desires of 
victims of conflict, it is accepted that there is significant overlap with what we do know 
concerning the experiences of victims of violent crime in the domestic sphere (Doak, 2008). 
The needs of such victims may be either material or psychological in nature (Shapland and 
Hall, 2007). Whereas material needs may include compensation for loss of earnings, 
assistance with medical or funeral expenses and the replacement of damaged or stolen 
property, psychological needs may include coming to terms with past events, overcoming 
feelings of anger and powerlessness, as well as clinical conditions including depression and 
post-traumatic stress. Research appears to suggest that victims place as high a priority on 
symbolic forms of reparation as they do upon material recompense (Braithwaite, 2002; 
Shapland et al, 1985; Strang, 2002). There is, for example, an abundance of evidence that 
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victims place a high value on receiving apologies (Fercello and Umbreit, 1998; Strang, 
2002.), and this prospect is often an important factor influencing their decision to become 
involved in mediation and restorative justice programmes (Strang, 2002).  However, there is 
a risk such forms of reparation may be perceived as being grossly disproportionate and may 
trivialize suffering, so justice may be seen as being belittled or degraded if not backed up by 
something more tangible, such as the restitution of property or financial compensation 
(Aukerman, 2002). Indeed, Clamp (2013) has argued that victims prioritise peace and 
stability over other forms of reparation. 
Just as many transitional justice mechanisms have often failed to deliver effective 
participation for victims, their efforts to provide effective redress to victims have also fallen 
short on occasion. The nature of the difficulties present in many post-conflict societies mean 
that the reparatory ideal is often difficult to obtain in practice owing to the complexities of 
transitional environments, the scale and seriousness of the acts committed; the blurred line 
between victims and offenders and the large numbers typically involved in the conflict 
(Clamp, 2013). Thus whilst the South African TRC has been widely lauded for its 
contribution to the political transition to democracy, empirical research illustrates victims’ 
material needs largely remained unaddressed (Byrne, 2004; Hamber et al, 2000).  
Compensation payments – in particular – have been widely criticised. De Greiff (2010) notes 
that while the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission had proposed giving 
victims a yearly grant of around $2,700 for six years, the Government ended up making a 
one-off payment of less than $4,000. This figure, he observes, compares unfavourably with 
Latin American jurisdictions, where substantially greater sums were offered to victims of 
state violence and families of the disappeared (de Greiff, 2010). State-led reparation 
programmes thus differ substantially from each other, but the sheer proliferation of such 
programmes in recent times is indicative of the growing consensus that transitional justice 
mechanisms are becoming increasingly victim-orientated in their character. The specific 
components of the best formula for reparation are likely to vary according to the needs and 
social context of a particular set of victims, and may comprise a mixture of symbolic and 
material awards. 
The provision of reparation, however, need not emanate from a stand-alone programme. 
Particularly pertinent for the purposes of this article, however, is the fact that reparation may, 
in fact, be effected through the criminal process. The provision of redress is arguably as 
important, if not more so, than the punishment of perpetrators, and its importance to the 
overall ‘package’ of justice is highlighted through the inclusion of reparatory mechanisms 
within the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Not only are victims potential 
participants in the trial process, but they are also potential recipients of reparations pursuant 
to Article 75(1) which stipulates that the Court shall ‘establish principles relating to 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims.’ It may then ‘determine the scope and extent of any 
damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims’ and, under para (2), ‘make an order 
directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, 
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.’  
 
Whilst this definition of reparation is much narrower than that provided by the United Nations 
in its 2006 Body of Principles, the conception is broad enough to embrace different 
modalities of rectifying harm (Wemmers, 2006). From a legal perspective, this is the most 
straightforward means of awarding reparations, although, as an alternative, the Court may 
order that reparations be made available through the Trust Fund established under Article 79 
of the Statute.11 Although the inclusion of these provisions have been widely lauded (Doak, 
2008; Nserko, 2010; Wemmers, 2006;), doubts remain as to how effective they are likely to 
be in practice, not least because the sheer scale of international crimes would likely dwarf 
monetary resources of both individual perpetrators and the Trust Fund (Van den Wyngaert, 
2012).  
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Traditionally, the concept of redress has not received much attention within common law 
criminal justice systems. From a structural perspective, the pursuit for reparation is made 
through the civil rather than the criminal courts or, alternatively, through stand-alone state 
compensation programmes. Whilst criminal courts in many jurisdictions have held the power 
to issue compensation orders in the course of criminal proceedings for some time, such an 
approach is problematic insofar as such orders may not cover any psychological or 
emotional injuries of the victim. The model is also built on the rather dubious assumption that 
any material harm can be quantified in purely pecuniary terms. Compensation orders aside, 
there is little room in common law courts for any value to be attached to the more symbolic 
forms of reparation that commonly feature in transitional societies, such as formal apologies, 
truth-telling; guarantees of non-repetition, or the restoration of rights. Adversarial trials 
simply do not create the necessary space for victims and perpetrators to interact in a 
meaningful way, let alone enter any form of dialogue. In some ways, this should not come as 
a surprise as criminal courts are normatively concerned with the punishment of the offender 
in the name of the state. It is thereby feared that infusing the victims’ reparatory interests 
within the public function of criminal justice system would create fresh tensions and 
ambiguity concerning the function and organisation of both civil and criminal law (Frehsee, 
1999).  
Perhaps the primary lesson that may be drawn from transitional environments for ‘ordinary’ 
criminal justice is that ‘doing justice’ ought not to be a task that is solely concerned with 
punishing the perpetrator. Some form of punishment may well be a moral imperative, but 
punishment alone cannot be justified as the only - or primary - need of victims (Elster, 2004). 
Some jurisdictions have now expressly provided that redress ought to form one of the core 
objectives of the penal system. In England and Wales, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 placed 
the goals of sentencing on a statutory footing, meaning that reparation was now to be 
considered alongside the four classic objectives.12 In theory at least, contemporary 
sentencing ought to reflect a combination of several or all of these elements.  However, no 
guidance is available as to what weight ought to be afforded to each of these objectives; and 
the extent to which the reparation - as something of a novel interloper – will feature 
alongside the more established aims of sentencing is very much dependent on the 
subjective view of sentencers. If reparation is to play an active role in sentencing 
considerations, then it is also incumbent upon the state to facilitate the provision of 
reparation through some form of practical and accessible mechanism.  
The most obvious means of achieving this would be through the widespread provision of 
mediation and restorative justice programmes which would be triggered once an offender 
admitted guilt and consented to such a process. Recent years have seen such conferencing 
programmes, in particular, expand dramatically with statutory schemes now operating for 
young offenders in New Zealand, Northern Ireland, and most Australian jurisdictions. The 
use of restorative interventions for adult offenders are less commonplace and tend not to be 
embedded within the formal criminal justice system. For the most part, programmes tend to 
operate on an ad hoc basis, often in partnership with local government or criminal justice 
agencies (Hopkins, 2012; Johnstone, 2011). That said, their use is certainly becoming more 
commonplace, and legislation was recently introduced in England and Wales to provide a 
statutory basis by which courts may defer imposing sentence until a restorative activity has 
taken place.13 It remains to be seen how the provision will be used in practice, and whether it  
might act as something of a precursor to placing restorative justice on a more prominent 
(and legally certain) footing within the criminal justice system.  If this were to happen, it 
would provide a considerable boost to the role afforded to reparation within the criminal 
justice system. Rather than compensation being enforced by the court, parties might 
themselves negotiate their own reparation agreement, which might the weave some form or 
restorative component into the sentence. 
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The type of restorative intervention envisaged by this legislation is only one way in which 
reparation might gain a better foothold within mainstream criminal justice. Another possibility 
would be for the court to refer certain cases to a restorative justice programme provider, 
which would then aim to resolve the dispute between the parties, with the outcome being 
subject to the agreement of the court; a similar model of court-referral already operates in 
respect of young offenders in Northern Ireland and New Zealand. Alternatively, as the 
proposal in the previous section suggested, sentencing hearings themselves could be 
recalibrated so that they allow some of direct deliberation between victims and offenders. 
Provided both parties agreed and appropriate safeguards were put in place, parties 
themselves might negotiate their own reparation agreement with judicial oversight, which 
may then be taken into account by the court in formulating the final sentence. 
Even where the parties have not had an opportunity to engage in a restorative encounter, 
there is still scope for the current sentencing exercise to acknowledge the desirability of 
reparation. For example, in England and Wales current sentencing guidelines offer very little 
detail as to the weight that sentencers ought to attach to personal mitigation in general, and 
expressions of remorse in particular (Doak and Taylor, 2013). Judges could, for example, be 
offered guidance as to how remorse might be assessed; whether it might carry more weight 
if accompanied by an unconditional apology, an offer of reparation or any other step taken to 
make amends. Bibas (2007) proposes that US federal sentencing law should be amended to 
replace the almost-automatic 35% sentence discount for guilty pleas with a sliding scale that 
reflects remorse, apology, forgiveness and any acts of contrition. It is thus possible that the 
English sentencing system, which also operates a similar automatic discount, might also 
benefit through the introduction of a scaled mechanism which would encourage reparatory 
acts from the offender in exchange for a lighter sentence. 
An alternative course of action might draw directly from Article 75 of the Rome Statute, 
whereby a form of adhesion or partie civile process could be instigated – not dissimilar to 
that which currently operates in certain continental jurisdictions (see further Brienen and 
Hoegen, 2000). The effect of this would be that the civil and criminal issues would effectively 
be resolved through a unitary process, thus eradicating the need for victims to pursue a 
prolonged civil action which is unlikely to be financially viable in any case. Randy Barnett 
(1977: 290) famously proposed such a system which would give consideration ‘to the 
conduct, broadly defined, of the parties to the case with a view toward the protection of 
individual liberty and private property.’ Viewing conflicts through such a unitary lens would 
potentially address a much wider set of aims above and beyond either criminal justice or the 
private law of tort. Instead, the resolution of the victim / offender conflict would be 
reconceptualised as part of the wider public interest, since the community is made up of 
‘victims, potential victims and the fellow citizens of victims’ (Cavadino and Dignan, 1996: 
237). Whilst the adhesion and partie civile models of both continental Europe and the ICC 
are far from perfect (Brienen and Hoegen, 2000), their operation illustrates that there ought 
to be no practical barrier to enabling unitary actions capable of addressing both the public 
wrongs committed against society as well as the private wrongs committed against the 
victim. However, the deeply entrenched nature of the common law paradigm which draws a 
neat (though unconvincing) line between the private and public realms means that such a 
radical reconfiguration of the criminal trial remains an indeterminate prospect. 
 
Conclusions 
This article began by identifying three prevalent themes in transitional justice discourse 
which might be used to inform ‘ordinary’ criminal justice policymaking in ‘settled’ societies. 
These themes or values are widely used as benchmarks of victim-orientated justice in post-
conflict environments and are acknowledged to be vital in order to bolster both satisfaction 
rates among victims as well as the overall moral legitimacy of justice processes. The fact 
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that transitional justice mechanisms often fall short in terms of delivery does not undermine 
the inherent value of truth recovery, participation and reparation. Rather, it underlines the 
need to sharpen praxis so that it is capable, as far as possible, to safeguard these values 
irrespective of the particular mechanism(s) that may be used to deliver transitional justice. 
It is recognised that transitional environments differ substantially from each other, and the 
transitional justice paradigm itself differs from that of ‘ordinary’ criminal justice in a number of 
ways. Certainly, it would be foolhardy to advocate an automated importation of any one set 
of practices before carefully unpacking and recalibrating them to work so that they could 
operate effectively within the existing parameters of the common law adversarial system. To 
some extent, some positive signals are emerging which suggest that these values are 
already fertilising the criminal justice arena; the 2012 EU Directive on Victims’ Rights and the 
2009 UN Guidelines on Justice in matters involving child victims and witnesses affirm the 
desirability of effective participation and reparation as benchmarks of good practice. 
Moreover, the growing prominence of restorative justice is undoubtedly a positive 
development. Although transitional justice cannot claim credit for its recent international 
proliferation, the conceptual overlap between the restorative and transitional paradigms has 
informed both theory and practice, and its inherent appeal to post-conflict societies stems 
from the value it places on the participation of all parties, as well as its capacity to provide 
both material and symbolic forms of redress directly from the perpetrator. However, 
restorative justice remains, for the time being at least, on the periphery of the ‘ordinary’ 
criminal justice system in most common law systems. Indeed, even the most passionate 
proponents of restorative justice acknowledge it is not a magic bullet. It cannot, for example, 
operate as a fact-finding mechanism where the accused does not accept responsibility for 
the offence, or where either party does not consent to the process. There are also difficult 
questions to resolve in terms of its limits in relation to serious offences including sexual 
offences and domestic abuse (Stubbs, 2007; Cossins, 2008).  
It is therefore important that victims’ rights proponents (who often overlap with proponents of 
restorative justice) recognise that restorative interventions will never displace conventional 
criminal justice entirely, one of the key questions that must therefore be explored is whether 
– and, if so, how – the key values of truth recovery, participation and reparation might be 
bolstered within the parameters of existing criminal justice trial structures. Thus 
developments such as victim impact statements are and will continue to be an important 
mechanism for participation, but the time has also come to give more careful consideration 
to innovative policy options which may succeed in helping to transform the adversarial trial 
arena into a more agreeable – and more just environment – for victims of crime. 
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